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Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government.
By Philip Pettit. New York, Oxford University Press, 1997.
Pp. 304. Hard Cover. $29.95
Reviewed by Mortimer Sellers*
The United States Constitution provides that the federa-
tion shall guarantee a "[r]epublican [florm of [g]overnment"
to every state in the Union.1 This makes republicanism one
of the guiding principles of American law, to be imposed, by
force if necessary, whenever states depart from their republi-
can foundations. Yet despite its central position in American
constitutional law, the republican guarantee has become an
ideological cipher, used to mean anything or nothing and
generally ignored by judges and lawyers, or misapplied by le-
gal academics.2 Now at last Philip Pettit's new book on Re-
publicanism examines republican government from a sound
historical perspective, illuminating the republican guarantee
in the light of contemporary philosophical insights, and sug-
gesting what republican ideals require, applied to modern
problems.
Pettit does not waste much space on history, because his
purpose is normative, but his short first historical chapter
* A.B. 1980, J.D. 1988, Harvard University. B.C.L. 1988, D.Phil. 1986,
Oxford University. M.N.S. Sellers is a Professor of Law and Director of the
Center for International and Comparative Law at the University of Baltimore
School of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
2. See G. Edward White, Reflections of the "Republican Revival": Inter-
disciplinary Scholarship in the Legal Academy, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1994);
Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11
(1992) (critizing the use of republican terminology by law school academics).
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justifies the rest of the book by explaining clearly and suc-
cinctly what republicanism is and has been through the
ages.! Recent American academic and law school discussions
have sometimes implied that Aristotle,4 Sparta,5 or Athenian
democracy' were in some sense models of republican govern-
ment in the United States and elsewhere.' Pettit correctly
insists that republican allusions always evoked the primor-
dial conception of liberty, or libertas, of the world's first res
publica in Rome.8
Republican liberty requires that governments must
never intervene in private lives, except to serve the common
good (res publica) of the people.! Pettit demonstrates that
republics secure liberty for their citizens as "non-
domination," protecting all equally against arbitrary interfer-
ence by self-interested groups, individuals or the state." He
usefully distinguishes more recent Hobbesian conceptions of
liberty as license, or the absence of restraint, from the older
republican tradition of liberty through law." This differs
from simple democracy or tyranny of the majority in not be-
ing populist, homogenous, or even necessarily communitar-
ian." The state is not the servant of the people, but their
trustee, acting faithfully in the interests of all."
Pettit's Project
Pettit's argument begins (chapter 1) with a history of the
republican conception of liberty, culminating in its greatest
3. Cf. M.N.S. SELLERS, Republican Liberty, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
LIBERTY (Moens and Ratnapala, eds., 1996).
4. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term, Foreword: Traces
of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986).
5. PAUL A. RAHE, REPUBLICS ANCIENT AND MODERN: CLASSICAL RE-
PUBLICANISM AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992).
6. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH
OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996).
7. These views probably derive from misreadings of J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC
REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975).
8. M.N.S. SELLERS, AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM: ROMAN IDEOLOGY IN THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1994).
9. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND
GOVERNMENT, at vii (1997).
10. Id. at vii.
11. Id. at 5.
12. Id. at 8.
13. Id. at 9.
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triumph in the American Revolution. He goes on (chapter 2)
to develop a philosophy of freedom as non-domination, distin-
guishing republican liberty from later Hobbesian construc-
tions of freedom as non-interference. This lays the ground-
work for a broader application of liberty (chapter 3) to the
project of designing a state. Pettit sets out to explain
(chapter 4) the egalitarian and communitarian appeal of re-
publican political and legal institutions. Such institutions
will act (chapter 5) to restrain private power, which Pettit
calls "dominium," as well as public power (chapter 6), which
Pettit calls "imperium." This requires certain regulating
checks and balances (chapter 7) to keep the system stable, al-
though Pettit concludes (chapter 8), that republican institu-
tions will not be enough in themselves. To succeed they also
need the support of virtue, which is to say, of embedded re-
publican attitudes in society at large.
The project as a whole falls into two parts. First (Part I),
Pettit must identify what republican freedom is. Then (Part
II), having done so, he explores the political and legal institu-
tions that secure republican government in a just and stable
commonwealth, or free state. Applied to United States con-
stitutional discourse, Part I corresponds to the Preamble and
XIVth Amendment: what it is to "secure the blessings of lib-
erty to ourselves and our posterity" 4 or "deprive any person
of... liberty." 5 Part II corresponds to the body of the Consti-
tution, guaranteeing a "republican form of government" to
every state in the Union. 6 Neither makes sense without the
other. Republican governments secure liberty. Liberty de-
fines republican government. This is why, as George Wash-
ington observed when he inaugurated republican government
under the United States Constitution, "the sacred fire of lib-
erty and the destiny of the republican model of government,
are justly considered as deeply, perhaps as finally, staked on
the experiment entrusted to the hands of the American Peo-
ple." 7
14. U.S. CONST. preamble.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
16. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
17. George Washington, The First Inaugural Speech (April 30, 1789), in
GEORGE WASHINGTON: A COLLECTION, at 462 (W.B. Allen ed.,1988).
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Republican Liberty Defined
Republican liberty, as Pettit (correctly) defines it, re-
quires immunity from arbitrary power.18 Pettit repeats Tom
Paine's definition of arbitrary state power as the power in
public officials to act with themselves, "and not the res-
publica," as their object."9 So "[e]very government that does
not make the res-publica its whole and sole object, is not good
government" and "republican government is no other than
government established and conducted for the interest of the
public.""° Pettit considers governments arbitrary that have
the power to impose their will contrary to the public good,
whether or not they exercise this power. It is the lack of con-
straint that makes power arbitrary.2 Republics must be
"empire[s] of laws, and not of men."2
Law professors, judges and lawyers have tended to lose
sight of the purposes of America's constitutional experiment.
They casually adopt a new vocabulary of "negative" liberty
first advanced (as Pettit shows) by opponents of the Ameri-
can Revolution.23 This replaced the original republican con-
ception of liberty as non-domination with a new conception of
liberty as non-interference." Such profound changes in
meaning entailed corresponding changes in the law, or rather
in academic and judicial perceptions of the relationship be-
tween liberty and the law. 5 The original sense of liberty re-
quired law for its existence, since laws create the freedoms
that citizens share. As John Locke observed against Sir Rob-
ert Filmer: "the end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to
preserve and enlarge freedom," by protecting citizens against
the violent impositions of their fellow human beings.26
Recent liberal philosophers, rejecting Locke's viewpoint,
18. PETTIT, supra note 9, at 51.
19. Id. at 56, (quoting THOMAS PAINE, "THE RIGHTS OF MAN: PART II," re-
printed in POLITICAL WRITINGS 168 (Bruce Kuklick ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1989)).
20. Id. at 29-30 (cited and partially quoted in Pettit).
21. Id. at 55.
22. Id. at 39 (quoting JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMON WEALTH OF
OCEANA AND A SYSTEM OF POLITICS 8 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1992).
23. PETTIT, supra note 9, at 35-41.
24. Cf. M.N.S. SELLERS, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: REPUBLICANISM,
LIBERALISM, AND THE LAW (1998).
25. PETTIT, supra note 9, at 35-41.
26. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, at II.57 (1690).
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have embraced the doctrine of Hobbes and Filmer, to view
liberty as the absence of restraint, and all law as a "fetter" on
freedom.27 Pettit's book makes the interesting point that
such attitudes were never widely accepted or popular until
Lord North's propagandist, John Lind, introduced them to
the British public as part of that government's pamphlet
campaign against the United States." Jeremy Bentham, also
an opponent of the American and French revolutions, insinu-
ated similar vocabulary into nineteenth-century liberalism,29
from which it passed to contemporary liberals such as Isaiah
Berlin."0
Since liberty means government by laws that serve the
common good, procedures for making and executing the laws
necessarily determine the existence (or non-existence) of a
republic. This explains the importance of constitutions and
forms of government to so many republican thinkers. Re-
publics require public discussion." There must be democratic
procedures.32 But the central value of republican liberty is
government for the common good, and consequent protection
against the domination of others. Democracy and discussion
are republican only to the extent that they protect citizens
against the arbitrary will of government officials. 33 Pettit ar-
gues that actual consent by the citizens is much less impor-
tant to republican government than their general ability to
contest decisions of the state,34 when state decisions violate
the common good.35
Pettit's Mistake
Nothing contributes more to understanding difficult
questions of law and philosophy than to read something that
is right, elegant and convincing in almost every detail, and
then to look for mistakes. Not that the author will necessar-
27. E.g., Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty: An Inaugural Lecture, De-
livered before the Univ. of Oxford on (Oct. 1958), in Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY,
at 8 n.2 (Oxford Univ. Press 1958).
28. PETTIT, supra note 9, at 42-44.
29. Id. at 49.
30. Id. at 50.
31. Id. at 56.
32. Id. at 27.
33. PETTIT, supra note 9, at 30.
34. Id. at 61-63.
35. Id. at 68.
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ily be mistaken, but disagreement reveals new areas for
study, and clarifies one's own perceptions. Pettit's under-
standing of liberty and its republican origins cuts through the
confusion of decades with short sharp strokes of erudition.
His exposition of liberty in modern language is clear and cor-
rect. Yet this very clarity undermines Pettit's subsequent re-
statement of non-domination as a political ideal, because it
reveals how much he concedes to the Benthamite doctrine of
liberty as non-interference that he first set out to refute.
This strikes me as a mistake. Liberty as a political ideal
must begin and end with its theory of state action. Pettit di-
gresses when he speaks of maximizing autonomy, or the right
to be left alone. 6
This happens when Pettit makes freedom as non-
domination his supreme political value. 7 Liberty should be
supreme, but not in the sense that he implies. The confusion
arises from viewing liberty as "the chiefest good of civil soci-
ety."3 This makes liberty seem to be a good to be sought by
civil institutions, comparable to other goods protected by gov-
ernment, and possibly at odds with them. This cannot be
true if liberty means government by laws in pursuit of the
common good. Liberty is not a good but a status. Liberty is
what citizens enjoy when government serves the common
good. The common good must be found through some sepa-
rate procedure. Liberty is not a good in itself, but a guaran-
tee that magistrates will act to serve the public good and only
to serve the public good. Liberty means independence from
domination by the arbitrary will of others. To make liberty
itself the measure of what is arbitrary would be meaningless
circularity.
Domination happens in two ways. The state can domi-
nate its subjects and private groups or individuals can domi-
nate their fellow citizens. Those who accept the Hobbesian
conception of liberty as non-interference will say that domi-
nation occurs in either case whenever the state or some other
power imposes restrictions on individual action. Pettit in-
sists (rightly) that states do not dominate when they restrict
36. See id. at 80-109. Chapter 3 is entitled "Non-domination as a Political
Ideal."
37. Id. at 80.




individuals through law, in pursuit of the common good. But
neither do individuals, when they act lawfully. Not all influ-
ence is domination. Pettit seems to imply in his discussion of
non-domination as a political ideal that restricting interfer-
ence by one individual in the affairs or interests of another
necessarily increases the liberty of the one protected. This is
not so, unless interference violates the canons of fair coopera-
tion or, more precisely, laws (or standards) established by re-
publican deliberation in pursuit of the common good.
Liberal theory usually endorses autonomy as the most
important good or value, insisting that individuals should
control their own lives as much as possible. Benthamite vo-
cabulary views "liberty" in this way as the unfettered pursuit
of one's own private goals. Pettit would not want to say this,
but he seems to imply as much when he discusses govern-
ment's role in stopping private domination. Non-interference
is a good. It may be a valuable good, but it is only one of
many goods to be measured against the public interest. Re-
publics study human nature to create laws in the interests of
all members of society. Such laws may serve to expand
autonomy from fellow citizens or the state. But they may
also restrict autonomy in the service of liberty, which de-
pends on the public good.
Liberals often argue that people should be able to do
whatever they want provided that they do not "harm" one
another.39 Republicans believe that people should be able to
do whatever they want so long as they do not violate laws (or
social values) that serve the "common good." In some ways
"the common good" and "harm" are equivalent terms. A
Benthamite might say that so long as I have not "harmed"
you, then I have not interfered with you, in any judicially
cognizable way. The difference is that republican doctrine
supplies techniques for determining what constitutes the
common good. Liberal theory lacks any recognized measure
of what will count as harm, or improper interference in the
private affairs or liberty of others.
Pettit understands that republican liberty derives from
the common good, but he usually does not put it this way,
39. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY: WITH THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN AND
CHAPTERS ON SOCIALISM, at 13 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1989).
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preferring to write in terms of "non-domination," the absence
of "arbitrary" power, or simply of "liberty," unadorned. This
makes it easier to forget liberty's dependence on the common
good. Without government for the common good there is no
liberty. When laws advance the common good, then liberty is
secure. The measure of private domination is a public de-
termination of what should be the law. Interference in the
lives of others is not domination, so long as it respects the
spirit and the letter of the law. Non-interference may be a
desirable and valuable good, but it is only one good among
many others, to be valued through a republican calculus, re-
flected in the laws of the state.
Preventing Domination
Pettit would probably agree with these statements. Yet
his primary rhetorical emphasis on the idea of "non-
domination," rather than the common good, obscures the nec-
essary relationship between the legitimate private power of
individuals and the legitimate public power of the state.
When non-domination replaces non-interference as the free-
dom-lover's ideal, the state will be more likely to step in to
correct private imbalances of power in the family, the work-
place and many other social institutions where traditional
arrangements allow oppression of the weak by the strong. ' °
Freedom as non-domination is consistent with a high level of
non-arbitrary interference of the sort that laws might toler-
ate (or impose). Coercion does not always impede freedom in
a republican system of liberty under law.'
Advancing one group's freedom from domination means
reducing another's capacity for arbitrary interference in their
lives.42 Of course, this requires a definition of what will count
as "arbitrary." For republicans, arbitrariness will be meas-
ured by the common good. Pettit generally prefers to write
more obliquely of "expressing every citizen's voice in society."
He insists that citizens' views should be taken into account,
and overborne only when there is some independent reason
to do so.4 This may be so, but only because inclusive public
deliberation is the best available technique for finding or con-
40. PETTIT, supra note 9, at 78.
41. Id. at 84.
42. Id. at 86.
43. Id. at 91.
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structing the common good. When voices are ignored, or
overborne for private reasons, mistakes about justice will be
made. Republics offer systems for making use of everyone's
perceptions fairly to achieve the common goal."
Republican states act only to secure or create the com-
mon good of humanity. Put another way (Pettit's way) this
means designing institutions to maximize people's enjoyment
of freedom as non-domination.45 Republican constitutions (by
definition) prevent domination better than any available rival
institutions, because they act best to serve the common
good.46 Pettit rightly insists that contemporary republican-
ism must protect everyone equally from domination-not just
the small elite of property-owning citizens favored in late re-
publican Rome.47 He hopes that this idea will appeal across
boundaries of race, religion, gender and the various other
subcultures of modern pluralist society.48 If not, politics must
become (or remain) a simple exercise through which the
strong, or the majority, impose their views on the rest.
Republican ideals assume a teleological conception of
politics. The constitution's aim must be to serve the common
good, through whatever structures do this best. Pettit recog-
nizes this by showing how "rights" and other absolute prohi-
bitions on republican governments derive their validity from
the requirements of republican non-domination, applied to
human nature. They are not fundamental norms themselves,
but depend instead on the ultimate political imperative of
preventing domination.49
Republican constitutions prevent domination by serving
the common good. Republics stop their citizens from impos-
ing private desires on others when this would harm the
common good. Pettit compares good institutions to antibod-
ies against disease. Republican forms of government consti-
tute liberty because they prevent the infection of domination
in the state.5" So democracy (for example) is not what makes
a republic, although republican government cannot exist
44. Id. at 92.
45. PETTIT, supra note 9, at 95.
46. Id. at 95.
47. Id. at 96.
48. Id. at 97.
49. Id. at 101.
50. Id. at 108.
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without it.5" It is just one element in the republic's inocula-
tion against corruption and self-interest.
Republican Institutions
The first aim of republican institutions, as Pettit ex-
plains them, should be to prevent "dominium." By this he
means domination exercised through arbitrary private
power. 2 What counts as arbitrary will depend on various
contingent social circumstances, related to the common
good.53 Generally speaking, avoiding subjection in private life
mandates a generous distribution of basic resources, to pre-
vent dependency and the opportunities for coercion engen-
dered by poverty and need.54 People acting from dire neces-
sity are not free.55
Immunity or security against interference on an arbi-
trary basis confers power 56-the power of "independence."57
Independence of this kind does not mean separation from
others, as some liberal theories would imply, but rather inde-
pendence in the sense of not being dependent upon any other
person's naked will. Republican doctrine assumes the exis-
tence of common ground-a common good to be sought and
implemented for the benefit of all members of society. Lib-
erty is the status secured when states regulate all citizens
equally in pursuit of the common good.58
In preventing private domination or dominium, however,
states necessarily run the risk of imposing public domination,
or "imperium," to use Pettit's vocabulary.5 Republics prevent
dominium by state intervention, controlling private actions.
But in defining and punishing dominium, state power may
itself become arbitrary and exercise improper imperium, to
the detriment of freedom. This way of talking soon becomes
confusing because there is nothing inherently wrong with
51. See Mortimer Sellers, Republican Principles in International Law, 11
CONN. J. INT'L. L. 403 (1996). See also Mortimer Sellers, Republican Impartial-
ity, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 273 (1991).
52. PETTIT, supra note 9, at 146.
53. Id. at 147.
54. Id. at 160.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 69.
57. PETTIT, supra note 9, at 71.
58. Id. at 80.
59. Id. at 171.
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state power or with private power. The question really
should be in which circumstances does dominium or impe-
rium violate the common good? Institutions set up to curb
dangerous private power run the risk of imposing arbitrary
public power, unless constrained by a properly calibrated re-
publican frame of government.
The greatest value of the republican tradition derives
from centuries of discussion and experiment dedicated to de-
termining which forms of government serve the common good
best, while controlling arbitrary power. Most governments
recognize their duty to serve the common good and claim to
do so. Republican authors and experience long since estab-
lished that this will not be possible without certain specific
constitutional controls. As John Adams observed in advo-
cating the form of government eventually adopted in the
United States Constitution: "the principles and construction
of free governments ... were as well understood at the time
of the neighing of the horse of Darius, as they are at this
hour."" Pettit repeats them again: first, there must be the
rule of law; second, government must maintain a separation
of powers; and third, these separate powers must be con-
trolled by structural checks and balances to prevent any sin-
gle faction, including a democratic majority, from seizing con-
trol of the state.6
The rule of law condition requires republics always to
act, as much as possible, through law-like decisions." Pettit
does not pretend that judges or other public magistrates can
or should entirely avoid the exercise of discretion, but wants
discretion circumscribed to serve the public good,63 and so to
prevent the imposition of anyone's "inconstant, uncertain,
unknown, arbitrary will."64 The separation of powers condi-
tion-"dispersion of power"-makes it difficult for any one
person or group to seize arbitrary power over others. This
requires separating legislative, executive and judicial power,
but also bicameralism, and other restrictions on localized
60. 1 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN at ii (London, 1787).
61. PETTIT, supra note 9, at 173.
62. Id. at 174.
63. Id. at 176.
64. Id. (quoting MARY ASTELL, THE FIRST ENGLISH FEMINIST: REFLECTIONS
UPON MARRIAGE AND OTHER WRITINGS 76 (Bridget Hill ed., 1986)).
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power.65  Checks and balances-"the counter-majoritarian
condition"-exist to perpetuate these restrictions and separa-
tion. Republican popular sovereignty risks threats to justice
from the people or a majority. So Pettit sees it as a central
purpose of the courts to protect constitutional stability
against the democratic excesses and passions of the people.66
Democracy
Republican government has always been understood to
require popular sovereignty-"imperium populi"-through
which all laws and magistrates depend on votes by the peo-
ple.67 No glory was greater in Rome than to have protected
the "liberty and sovereignty of the people." But as Madison
insisted in his tenth and fourteenth Federalist letters, re-
publican popular sovereignty does not mean democracy. 8
The purpose of human society should be to bring each indi-
vidual's private good into harmony with every other's.69
Democratic majorities will not necessarily do this. ° As Pettit
explains it, republican institutions must harness democracy
to serve the public, rather than some private good, so that
public decision-making tracks the interests and ideas of all
the citizens that it protects.7'
Democracy, in its strictest sense, means rule by the peo-
ple. Pettit would redefine republican "democracy" as the
ability to contest decisions that violate one's interests.
"Decision-maker's [should be] accountable to the ordinary
people whom they affect"72-not necessarily through elec-
tions. Pettit would wish all citizens to have the opportunity,
voice and a forum in which to contest public decision-
65. PETTIT, supra note 9, at 177-78.
66. Id. at 180-81.
67. M. TULLI CICERO, PHILIPPICAE, I.iv.8 ("[D]ecrevit Sentus D. Brutum op-
time de re publica mereri, cum senatus auctoritatem populique Romani liber-
tatem imperiumque defenderet.").
68. THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 126-27, 140-41 (James Madison, Alexander
Hamilton, John Jay) (Isaac Kramnick ed., London, 1987).
69. M. TULLI CICERO, DE OFFICIIS III.vi.26. ("Ergo unum debet esse omni-
bus propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas unius cuiusque et universorum.").
70. M. TULLI CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA III.xxxiii.45. ("Ac nullam quidem
citius negaverim esse rem publicam, quam istam, quae tota plane sit in multi-
tudinis potestate.").
71. PETTIT, supra note 9, at 184.
72. Id. at 186.
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making. 3 This does not mean the ability simply to assert
one's interests, but rather the opportunity to participate in
public deliberations that determine the general benefit of the
whole community. 74 The whole community must participate
in these deliberations to find solutions that truly serve eve-
rybody. 5
Here Pettit proposes to reconcile republican democracy
with multiculturalism, by allocating seats in the legislature
in some way that will capture the views of every significant
social, cultural or hereditary faction.7 ' The administrative
and judicial arms of government (he suggests) should simi-
larly embrace representatives of "the major stakeholder
groupings."77 Such provisions would seem to violate the usual
republican purposes of fraternity, harmony and convergence
by institutionalizing various self-interested mediating'"social
movements" or alliances. Pettit hopes that by allocating rep-
resentation on the basis of prevailing social distinctions, he
will empower important voices that might otherwise be lost
to the debate. 8
Pettit's emphasis on "voice" reiterates the importance of
including all citizens in the public good sought by the state.
This implies broad confidence in human abilities to partici-
pate in and contribute to public debate and runs counter to
Pettit's endorsement elsewhere of government by autono-
mous, professionally informed bodies that are "not exposed to
the glare and the pressure of public debate." 9 Republicanism
embraces democratic deliberation as a vehicle for finding or
creating a common interest. This means that every voice
should be heard and taken seriously, but not that every ar-
gument must be accepted or acted on. Pettit recognizes that
reasonable people often differ, so that someone must be over-
ruled." Democratic deliberation helps citizens to make such
choices well, so long as republican structures of government
guide debate towards satisfying the common good. "[T]he
democratic process is designed to let the requirements of rea-
73. Id. at 187.
74. Id. at 188-89.
75. Id. at 190-91.
76. PETTIT, supra note 9, at 191.
77. Id. at 192.
78. Id. at 123.
79. Id. at 197.
80. Id. at 198.
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son materialize and impose themselves."81
Republican Virtue
Having adopted the republican view that public life
should be organized to make decisions on the basis of rea-
son,8 thus preventing any arbitrary interference in citizens'
lives,83 Pettit must explain how to do so, given the numerous
weaknesses of human nature. He begins with the premise
that people often mean well, but are also self-interested and
corruptible.84 If possible, the virtuous should be given posi-
tions of power,8" then encouraged to behave well," and pun-
ished if they do not.87 To behave well, in this context, means
debating and deciding on public questions by considering and
supporting the shared interests of all members of society.
Carefully designed republican institutions may control
democracy to some extent, in the interests of all, but they will
not work without public support, in an atmosphere of vir-
tue.89 Even Machiavelli understood that laws need good mor-
als to work properly, just as morals need good laws.9" Pettit
calls this republican "civility"91-the disposition of citizens
from different perspectives to seek the good of society as a
whole and not just their own parochial interests.92 The peo-
ple must be made to recognize both that freedom as non-
domination is desirable and how best to secure it. 93 Republi-
can laws are not just sanctions, but signals of what civil life
requires. 4
Fostering such virtue or civility strikes Pettit largely as a
question of building group identity around shared values.95
This identity must embrace all citizens, particularly the most
81. PETTIT, supra note 9, at 201.
82. Id. at 203.
83. Id. at 207.
84. Id. at 211, 217.
85. Id. at 219.
86. PETTIT, supra note 9, at 222.
87. Id. at 229.
88. Id. at 232-33.
89. Id. at 241-43
90. Id. at 242 (quoting Niccol6 Machiavelli).
91. PETTIT, supra note 9, at 245.
92. Id. at 249.
93. Id. at 252.
94. Id. at 253.
95. Id. at 257.
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needy, through norms of solidarity with others, not norms of
self-assertion and compromise-like those that liberals es-
pouse.9" Identification with others is a natural phenomenon,
and it is no miracle of self-denial to do a little extra to help
one's neighbors or to express humility about one's own pri-
vate views in the face of public consensus.9" Pettit's concept
of non-domination does not preclude human community.
Good personal relationships of love and friendship presup-
pose the enjoyment of freedom as non-domination among the
parties involved.98
John Adams believed, with James Harrington and his
many other republican predecessors, that good orders make
good men and that lost virtue, "even among highwaymen,"
could be replaced "by setting one rogue to watch another" un-
til "the knaves themselves may, in time, become honest men
by the struggle."99 Pettit is less sanguine, but endorses re-
publican forms of government just the same. Livy considered
Rome fortunate not to have achieved her republic before a
real sense of community had time to grow, and the people
were fit to be free.'00 Pettit recognizes this sense of commu-
nity as an essential condition of republican government, but
also among its most important products. Cicero put it first
and best when he described republics as communities built
around a shared sense of justice and the common good.'0' Re-
publics need this common purpose to survive.
The Republican Manifesto
Let me repeat the central points of the republican mani-
festo, as Pettit presents them in his much-needed restate-
ment and elaboration of the old republican tradition. Use-
fully summarized at the end of the book, Pettit's argument
has two parts, considering (I) the principles and (II) the
forms of republican government. As to principles, Pettit (1)
reasserts the republican conception of liberty as protection
96. PETTIT, supra note 9, at 259.
97. Id. at 260.
98. Id. at 268.
99. 3 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN at 505 (London, 1787).
100. TITUS LiviUS, AB URBE CONDITA 2.1.
101. M. TULLIUS CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA I.xxv.39 ("[R]espublica res populi,
populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coe-
tus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus.").
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against arbitrary interference with the choices of a free per-
son. He then (2) endorses law as capable of offering such pro-
tection. Interference (3) is arbitrary when it is controlled by
the arbitrium-private will or judgment-of the decision-
maker. Pettit believes (4) that freedom as non-domination
will best be secured through centralized political action by
the state. This means (5) that states should seek to extend
the range of citizens' undominated choice, and particularly
(6) the choices of the most vulnerable members of society.
The forms of republican government that Pettit advo-
cates to implement his ideal of freedom as non-domination
will be "dynamic" as he puts it, because circumstances, inter-
ests and ideas change over time. Even so, certain basic
structures will be necessary to prevent (private) dominium or
the (public) imperium of the state. These include (1) the rule
of law; (2) the dispersion or separation of powers; and (3)
strong protections against overbearing democratic majorities;
so that (4) those subject to the state can contest its decisions,
without imposing their own arbitrary desires on others. Pet-
tit suggests (5) that public opinion can be an important con-
straint on malfeasance by those in positions of authority, but
only (6) if the people themselves can be made to internalize
the republican values of the state. Pettit also makes several
other important arguments, which I omit here because they
respond to critics of republicanism, or seek to situate his
views in broader philosophical debates.
For lawyers unfamiliar with the republican tradition
Pettit's bifurcated account convincingly presents both the
purposes (Part I) and essential structural requirements (Part
II) of republican constitutions such as those of the United
States. He departs from tradition in Part I, while perhaps
improving on it, by seeking to expand the "range" of citizens'
undominated choice by creating more opportunities for the
underprivileged, and in Part II by replacing voting with
"contestation" as the essence of popular sovereignty.
For the uninitiated lawyer, this book's only weakness, if
it has one, lies in where it begins-with the republican defi-
nition of liberty as security against the arbitrary will of an-
other. This definition is important, correct and the basis of
liberty as protected by the United States Constitution, but it
is meaningless without an antecedent conception of what will
count as "arbitrary." For republicans, as Pettit recognizes,
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arbitrary power is power unconstrained by the public good.
The central purpose of republican government is service to
the common good. Not to say so immediately at the begin-
ning of this monograph on republicanism risks misleading
the numerous readers Pettit deserves to have, who will (and
should) turn to his book for their first introduction to the re-
publican ideas, and the underlying political and legal phi-
losophy of the United States Constitution. Without a fuller
explanation of the purpose of republican government, such
readers may not fully grasp what should count as
"domination," or what is a republic, or liberty, or how one can
find them.
So what are the fundamentals of republican government
as understood by Adams, Madison, and the framers of the
United States Constitution? Republican government re-
quires "equal laws" made by "comment consent" for the
"general interest" or "public good" of the people.' 2 "The great
question therefore is, what combination of powers in society,
or what form of government, will compel the formation of
good and equal laws, an impartial execution, and faithful in-
terpretation of them, so that the citizens may constantly en-
joy the benefit of them, and be sure of their continuance."' °
First, there should be the rule of law, and division of govern-
ment between the executive, senate and popular assembly, as
in republican Rome.0 But American republicans also en-
dorsed the separation of powers, checks and balances, inde-
pendent judges with life tenure, and representation (rather
than direct participation) of the people in the legislature.' °
Without these "republican" protections the Constitution's
framers believed there could be no republic or liberty, which
is to say no security in one's life, liberty or property against
the depredations of others or the state.' 6
This list differs from Pettit's only in putting the common
good first, as the basis of the "res publica," or public interest,
and so of liberty. The old Roman "libertas" indicated the
102. ADAMS, supra note 60, at 123.
103. Id. at 128.
104. Id. at 14.
105. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 199 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick
ed., 1987).
106. 3 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN at 505 (London, 1787).
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status of a free citizen in a free state or "republic." Republi-
can liberty signified restraint and protection by laws made
for the common good, through popular sovereignty, in a
mixed and balanced constitution. Put another way, this
means that "liberty consists only in being subject to no man's
will, ""' being subject to nothing but the law. °8
Philip Pettit has done lawyers an immense service by
providing them with a lucid, accurate presentation of the old
republican conception of liberty, coupled with his own sophis-
ticated, convincing exposition of how republican ideas might
apply to contemporary jurisprudence and political science.
My discussion here has concentrated on the first half of his
project, which clears away decades of confusion. The second
half should prove equally important, because it inaugurates a
new era of republican legal thought. Pettit's work begins to
explore how republican ideals and forms of government may
be realized at the end of the twentieth century. No challenge
is more important or difficult than to find common values in
today's divided world. Pettit points the way to solutions, and
lays the foundation for new structures of liberty and a mod-
ern science of the soul.
107. ALGERNON SIDNEY, 3 DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 402
(Thomas G. West ed., 1990) (1698).
108. ALGERNON SIDNEY, 1 DIscOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 17
(Thomas G. West ed., 1990) (1698).
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